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Introduction
Most of the auctions literature assumes either the seller, or bidders, or both to be risk neutral.
1 In this paper we consider a more general situation in which both the seller and bidders in an auction can be risk averse. This situation naturally arises when the seller and bidders are consumers, business persons or small …rms with limited capital. For instance, the seller of a unique painting may be as risk averse as the bidders competing for it. When both the seller and bidders are risk averse, an important question arises as to whether, given an ex post e¢ cient auction mechanism, the involved parties can bene…t from a risk-sharing scheme that enhances ex ante e¢ ciency of the mechanism without jeopardizing ex post e¢ ciency. 2;3 Put di¤erently, can we make all players, i.e., the seller and all types of the prospective bidders, better o¤ by modifying the payment rule of a mechanism while maintaining its allocation rule? The main contribution of our paper is to provide a mechanism that practically achieves this goal.
We consider a single-object auction environment and take the English auction (EA) as our benchmark auction model. The EA is one of the most widely practiced, and most extensively studied, auction format. Its open ascending-bid procedure ensures simplicity, transparency, optimal use of information, 4 and under various conditions 1 Exceptions that allow both the seller and buyers to be risk averse can be found in Hu, Matthews and Zou (2010) and Hu (2011) , where the focus is on the optimal reserve prices. 2 We use the term "ex ante" to mean the pre-auction stage when the auction rule may be subject to changes (by the seller, the auction designer, or as a result of bargaining). This may include the "interim" stage when each potential bidder has received his private information but does not know the others'information, as well as the stage when no bidder has received any private information (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Myerson, 1983; Crawford, 1985) .
3 Ex ante risk sharing should be distinguished from a separate problem of sharing ensuing risk between the seller and the winning bidder through joint ownership of the auctioned asset (e.g., the security design problem studied in DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz, 2005) .
leads to ex post e¢ cient outcomes. 5 Therefore, when the EA is Pareto ine¢ cient ex ante, it is of practical as well as theoretical importance to …nd out how the situation can be improved.
We generalize the EA to a class of English premium auctions (EPA), which proceeds just like an EA except that the highest two bidders receive a "pro…t share", or "premium", from the seller that is equal to a fraction of the di¤erence between the second and the third highest bids. This class of EPA includes EA as a special case when = 0 and it maintains the EA's simple and "detail-free" (Wilson, 1987) feature to the seller. In practice, premium auctions are regularly used in Europe to sell houses, land, and machinery among others. Various premium auctions have been analyzed in several previous studies. 6 In particular, the existence of equilibrium for a related EPA model has been established in our previous work (Hu, O¤erman and Zou, 2011) , which allows us to focus on the welfare analysis of risk sharing in the present study.
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The auction environment we consider extends the classical setting of Maskin and Riley (1984) in three aspects: (i) the seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can exhibit heterogeneous risk preferences, 8 and (iii) the seller can impose a binding 5 See, e.g., Maskin (1992) , Wilson (1998) , Krishna (2002) , Dubra Echenique and Manelli (2009), Birulin and Izmalkov (2010) , and Hu, Matthews and Zou (2013) . 6 For instance, see Goeree and O¤erman (2004) , Milgrom (2004) , Onderstal (2011), and Zou (2011) . Van Bochove, Boerner and Quint (2012) provide an interesting historical account of the "Anglo-Dutch premium auctions" used in the secondary market for …nancial securities in the eighteenth-century. 7 In Hu, O¤erman and Zou (2011) we considered the EPA in a symmetric interdependent-values setting of Milgrom and Weber (1982) with homogeneous bidders, …nding that when bidders are risk averse, revenue maximization is unlikely to be a good reason for the seller to o¤er any premiums in an EA. 8 Apart from being commonly recognized as a stylized fact (e.g., Arrow, 1971) , heterogeneity in risk preferences has been con…rmed in many experimental studies following Walker (1982, 1988) . For instance, Harrison, List and Towe (2007, p.437) reported that they "observe considerable individual heterogeneity in risk attitudes, such that one should not readily assume homogeneous risk preferences for the population." reserve price. 9 We also incorporate the possibility of ensuing risks in our model, e.g.,
where the auctioned object is, in essence, a risky asset. All these extensions are not necessary for our results, but the generality is certainly worthy of the endeavor as it provides more scope for potential applications. We do not seek optimal solutions that maximize the seller's expected utility, which typically involve ex post ine¢ ciency (e.g., Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) . As shown in Matthews (1983) and Maskin and Riley (1984) , even if the seller is risk neutral and bidders have the same homogeneous utility function, the problem of …nding an optimal auction mechanism is highly complicated. The existence of such an optimal mechanism requires strong assumptions on the utility and distribution functions as well as detailed knowledge of the seller about these functions. We therefore focus in this study on the detail-free and ex post e¢ cient EPA with the objective of obtaining sharp and applicable results, treating the reserve price and the premium rule as exogenously given.
The key result of our study is that in plausible situations, the EPA provides a Pareto improvement on the EA. This result applies to situations in which it is reasonable to expect that the seller is more risk averse than the buyers. For instance, when a household sells an antique in an auction to wealthy collectors, an author his manuscript to publishers, an inventor his patent to venture capitalists, or a small …rm its assets to large corporations, the prospective buyers are typically wealthier and, by a simple argument of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), more risk tolerant than the seller. In some situations, the seller can even check without a cost whether potential buyers are more risk tolerant. For instance, consider a setting in which the auctioned item is a risky asset whose value distribution is commonly known. Then as long as the seller imposes a reserve price that makes him indi¤erent between selling and not selling, the prospective buyer, by the very fact that he is willing to pay more than the reserve price, can be inferred to be more risk tolerant than the seller. 9 As we do not require that the seller imposes a reserve price strictly higher than his reservation value, there is no commitment problem or loss of e¢ ciency that may arise in the event of no sale since the seller will then be the one who values the object the most among all players.
In Section 2, we present the general model and describe how the EPA works. We introduce an e¤ective measure to tackle heterogeneous risk preferences, de…ned by a function(al) Q in (2). We show in Lemma 1 that, in the paradigm of expected utility theory, the quantity of Q has the same role of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for ordering risk preferences. But this measure of Q involves weaker assumptions and a broader scope of applications than the Arrow-Pratt measure.
In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium properties of the EA and EPA, showing that a binding reserve price causes the equilibrium bids in the EPA to exhibit a "jump"
at the reserve price (Theorem 1). An important consequence of this jump bidding, a phenomenon similar to the one observed in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) for their second-price auction equilibrium with externalities, is that at the interim stage the same reserve price will induce the same subset of active bidders in either the EA or the EPA. This property greatly simpli…es our comparative welfare analysis.
Section 4 contains the main …ndings from this study. We …rst show in Theorem 2 that for any number (> 2) of active bidders, the di¤erence in the seller's expected payo¤ between the EA and the EPA can be characterized by a functional of the utility function of the seller and that of the pivotal bidder-the one who determines the selling price in the EA. This result reveals an important role of the pivotal bidder for assessing the relative advantage of risk sharing in the EPA. It suggests that the seller will bene…t from the premium tactics whenever he is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder. Although the utility function of the pivotal bidder may not be known, this condition can often be assured to hold prior to the auction by deduction.
From the seller's viewpoint, we consequently obtain the following predictions that are direct implications of Theorem 2. Given any premium rule 2 (0; 1=2) and reserve price p 0 0; the seller is better o¤ in the EPA compared to the EA in either of the following scenarios.
Scenario 1: All active bidders are more risk tolerant than the seller (Proposition 1).
Scenario 2: The seller's preference belongs to that of the population of the bidders, and p 0 is no less than the seller's reservation value (Proposition 2 and Corollary 1).
Scenario 3: There is a su¢ ciently large number of potential bidders (Proposition 3).
Without any further restriction on the players'risk preferences, Scenario 1 is a signi…cant generalization of the auction environment studied in Waehrer et al. (1998) and Eso and Futo (1999) in which the seller is risk averse and bidders are risk neutral. Eso and Futo (1999) obtained an interesting result that among all incentive compatible mechanisms, there is one that is deterministic to the seller and is therefore, by a simple argument of revenue equivalence under risk neutrality, ex ante e¢ cient. As Eso and
Futo noted, however, their mechanism may involve large "gambles"among the bidders and fail to hold as soon as some bidders are risk averse. For such a mechanism the seller also needs to have accurate knowledge of how bidders'types are distributed.
In Scenario 2, the situation is akin to a business-to-business transaction in which the seller imposes a reserve price to prevent losses from the sale. The seller is then better o¤ using the EPA rather than the EA because of the deduced fact that the prospective buyer will be more risk tolerant. In Scenario 3, there may or may not be a binding reserve price. The prediction derives from the fact that as the bidder number increases, the probability increases toward 1 that the pivotal bidder is more risk tolerant than the seller. We obtain two more corollaries of Theorem 2 that when bidders are risk neutral, the EPA revenue is less risky than that of the EA in term of second-order stochastic dominance (Corollary 2); and that there exists an optimal 2 (0; 1=2] that maximizes the seller's expected utility among the class of EPAs considered (Corollary 3).
From the bidders' viewpoint, we show that under plausible conditions the risk averse bidders derive higher expected utilities in the EPA rather than the EA. The intuition lies in the twofold bene…ts that the premium o¤ers to risk averse bidders: it reduces the average payment (Hu, O¤erman and Zou, 2011) and it reduces the riskiness of the payment. This result extends Matthews'(1987) …nding that in independent private values settings, the DARA bidders prefer the second-price auction, or its strategically equivalent format EA, to the …rst-price auction. Our result shows that as long as bidders have nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, they further prefer the EPA to the second-price auction. 10 We establish this result …rst assuming that bidders have the same utility function that exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (Theorem 3). The case with heterogeneous bidders turns out to be surprisingly complicated and requires additional, although plausible, assumptions and it is proved in Theorem 4.
In Section 4.2.2 we provide a numerical example that illustrates the main results of the paper. Section 5 concludes the paper with remarks on future research. The proofs of the lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
Model and Preliminaries
We consider selling an indivisible object to N (> 2) potential bidders via an English premium auction (EPA). The seller announces a reserve price for the object, p 0 ; and observes n ( N ) active bidders. If n 2; then the auction will be conducted as a standard (button-) English auction (EA), in which case for n = 0, the auction results in no sale, for n = 1, the only active bidder wins the object and pays the reserve price p 0 , and for n = 2; the winner purchases the object for the price at which the other bidder quits.
For n > 2; the EPA will be conducted in two stages. 
We interpret function u( ; t) as type-t bidder's status-quo utility for income. The bidder with type t who drops out in the …rst stage will have utility u(0; t):
For ease of exposition, we refer to the special case where u(x; t) is independent of t in (1) as the homogeneous-utility model (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 1984) , 12 and the more general case as the heterogeneous-utility model in which u ( ; t) and u( ; t 0 ) can be two di¤erent utility functions given any t 6 = t 0 .
The functions u(x; t) and w(x; t) are assumed to satisfy the following mild con- 11 Hu, O¤erman and Zou (2011) considered a more general premium rule that is an increasing, but not necessarily linear, function of p X. In this paper, we restrict attention to linear premium rules for tractability, while noting that such simple rules are predominant in premium auction practices (e.g., Goeree and O¤erman, 2004) . 12 The term "homogeneous utility" refers only to the fact that all losing bidders have the same utility for income. The winning bidders'utility functions can still vary with their private types.
ditions.
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A1. u and w are thrice di¤erentiable.
A2. w( 1; t) < u(0; t) < w(0; t):
A4. u(x; t) u(z; t) is log-concave in x on (z; 1); 8z:
Condition A2 implies that all types of bidders would be better o¤ receiving the object for free (w(0; t) > u(0; t)), but no bidder is willing to pay too high a price for the object (w( 1; t) < u(0; t)). A3 is the usual assumption that utilities increase in income. A4 is commonly invoked to guarantee the existence of equilibria in …rst-price sealed-bid auctions (e.g., Holt, 1980; Athey, 2001) . It holds for risk averse bidders in general, and to some extent for risk preferring bidders as well.
The next two conditions involve the properties of the ratio 14 Q(x; y; t) u(x; t) w(x y; t)
A5. For all x; y; Q(x; y; t) is decreasing in t.
A6. For all y; t; Q(x; y; t) is nonincreasing in x.
The economic interpretations of A5 and A6 will become more transparent by considering some special cases of our model. We …rst present a lemma that will be frequently used later on for interpretations of the main results of this paper. The lemma can be seen as a corollary of Pratt (1964, Theorem 1) , which helps connect the expression in (2) to the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
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13 Subscripts denote the argument with respect to which a partial derivative is taken.
14 The notational dependence of Q on the functions u and w is suppressed. (ii) For all x and y such that y 6 = 0;
(iii) For all x and y; and for all nondegenerate random variablesṽ such that Eṽ exists;
For the homogeneous-utility model, the following four special cases have been considered in Maskin and Riley (1984) where U is an increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
Case 1 w(x; t) = U (t + x) and u(x; t) U (x):
Case 2 w(x; t) = U (t + (x)) and u(x; t) U ( (x)), where 0 > 0, 00 0; and (0) = 0:
Case 4 w(x; t) = (1 + t)U (t + x) and u(x; t) U (x); where U 0.
Case 1 is the standard private-values model. Case 2 allows a bidder to assign certain quality to the auctioned object, which may not have an equivalent monetary value. Case 3 allows the object to entail ensuing risks, where the true value v remains risky at the time when the auction concludes. In this case the conditional distribution of v for a higher type exhibits …rst-order stochastic dominance over that for a lower type. Case 4 provides an example in which winning the object gives the bidder a greater ability to derive pleasure, crudely translated into a higher marginal utility as well as utility for income.
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16 See Maskin and Riley (1984) for more detailed discussions of these cases.
It is easily seen that for Cases 1-4, conditions A1-A4 hold under proper assumptions on functions U and K. 17 The following lemma relates U to A5 and A6.
Lemma 2 For Cases 1-4, U 0 > 0 implies A5. U exhibiting nonincreasing absolute risk aversion implies A6 for Cases 1-3. If in addition U is nonnegative and is log-concave, then A6 holds for Case 4.
For the heterogeneous-utility model, it is clear that each of the Cases 1-4 can be generalized straightforwardly by replacing U (x) with U (x; t); so that u(x; t) = U (x; t) (or u(x; t) = U ( (x); t) for Case 2').
where v is twice continuously di¤erentiable with
Case 2' w(x; t) = U (v(t) + (x); t) where 0 > 0, 00 0; and (0) = 0:
Case 4' w(x; t) = (1 + t)U (v(t) + x; t) where U 0:
Cases 1'-4' generalize Cases 1-4 also in some other details. For instance, Case 3'allows the distribution K to be independent of t so that all bidders have the same probability distribution over v: This can be a situation in which all available information has been "priced" into the object for sale but because the bidders have di¤erent risk attitudes they may still have di¤erent expected (utility) payo¤s upon winning. More generally, Case 3' allows the bidders' types to a¤ect their risk preferences as well as their expectations about the object's uncertain value. For instance, t may be correlated to a bidder's wealth, a higher wealth level giving the bidder more favorable conditions for using or deriving values from the object.
For Cases 1'-4', conditions A1-A4 also easily hold with proper assumptions on U (x; t) and K(vjt). The next lemma gives an interpretation of A5-A6 in terms of U (x; t).
17 For instance, for Case 2 u is log-concave as long as U is log-concave in the sense of A4, since is a (weakly) concave function.
Lemma 3 Suppose A1-A4 hold. Further assume that U ( ; t) exhibits nonincreasing absolute risk aversion and that U ( ; t) is more risk averse than U ( ;t) whenever t <t:
Then A5-A6 hold for Cases 1'-4'.
Indeed, in all these cases the conditions A5-A6 can be replaced by the joint condition that u 11 (x; t)=u 1 (x; t) is nonincreasing in x and t: An important special case is where u(x; t) exhibits CARA in x for all t; or that A6 holds with Q 1 = 0: If A6 holds with Q 1 < 0; then by Lemma 1 it corresponds to the cases in which u(x; t) exhibits DARA in x for all t: However, since these cases are just special examples of our model and the function w(x; t) can be given other forms or interpretations (e.g., non-expected utility preferences), we maintain A5-A6 in this paper for generality.
Equilibrium
In both the EA and the EPA we assume that the seller chooses the same reserve price p 0 . We begin with the EA equilibrium, which serves as a benchmark for analyzing the EPA and welfare e¤ects of risk sharing in Section 4.
English auction
In the EA, it is routine to check that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in our setting. In this equilibrium, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for a type-t bidder to stay in the auction until the price reaches (t) such that
By A1-A3 the bid function is well de…ned on [0; H]; and it is increasing by A5.
If the reserve price p 0 < (0); it has no e¤ect and all bidders will participate in the EA. If p 0 > (H) then no bidder will be interested in bidding. From now on we assume that p 0 2 [ (0) Given any vector of types (t 1 ; :::; t N ) ; we let t (1) ; t (2) and t (3) denote the highest, second highest, and third highest types from among (t 1 ; :::; t N ). We call the bidder of type t (2) the pivotal bidder, who determines the selling price in the EA equilibrium.
An important property of the EA equilibrium is that the object for sale will be allocated to the one who has the highest willingness to pay for the object and therefore the EA is ex post e¢ cient. It is important to note that as long as the absolute risk aversion u 11 (x; t)=u 1 (x; t) is nonincreasing in x and t; the winning bidder in the EA should be also (weakly) more risk tolerant than all other bidders. This observation is further strengthened when the object for sale entails ensuing risk.
English premium auction
According to the EPA rule, if the number of participating bidders n 2, then the auction reduces to the EA and the preceding analysis of equilibrium strategy (t)
holds for this special case. Now suppose n > 2. As in the EA, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which bidders adopt the same bidding strategies. By backward induction, suppose that the …rst stage ends with bottom price X p 0 and the two …nalists adopt strategy b( ; X) :
[r; H] ! [X; 1) with updated lower bound r of the opponent's type distribution. We say that b is a second-stage equilibrium if conditional on X, adopting b( ; X) maximizes each …nalist's expected utility given that the other …nalist adopts the same strategy b:
At the start of the second stage, a …nalist with type t who bids as though his type is s ( r) derives a conditional expected utility equal to
Equilibrium requires U 2 (t; tjr; X) = 0; and it can be readily veri…ed that (see Hu, O¤erman and Zou, 2011, Theorem 1), by A1-A6, there exists a second-stage equilibrium that is the unique solution of the di¤erential equation in (7) under the boundary condition in (8):
such that b 1 > 0; where B(X) is the solution B that solves
The following lemma shows how b is a¤ected by the bottom price.
Lemma 4 Assume A1-A6. Then, on its e¤ective domain,
The second-stage strategy b(t; X) now induces a …rst-stage strategy ; which is given (implicitly) by
By Lemma 4 and the implicit function theorem, (t) is well de…ned and is continuously di¤erentiable, satisfying
Because is increasing, in equilibrium we have X = (t (3) ) and that both …nalists
Summarizing, the EPA strategy, denoted b ; can be fully described as follows.
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For all N potential bidders, 18 Because the left side in (9) increases in B and the right side decreases in B; by A1-A3 the solution B = B(X) is uniquely de…ned and di¤erentiable in X:
19 By the EPA rules, the e¤ective domain of b(t; X) is
20 The dependence of b on p 0 and ( ; ; b) is suppressed to ease notation.
(I) their pre-auction strategy is
This means that bidders with types lower than t 0 choose to abstain from bidding and the rest choose to participate. Once the auction begins, the active number n becomes common knowledge. Thus for the n active bidders, (II) their …rst-stage strategy is
The case with n 2 is straightforward. For n > 2; the …rst stage will end with a bottom price X and for the two …nalists, (III) their second-stage strategy is b (t) = b(t; X):
We say that b is an EPA equilibrium if (i) b( ; X) is a second-stage equilibrium conditional on any bottom price X; (ii) in the …rst stage with n > 2 active bidders, conditional on any updated information it is optimal for each bidder to adopt strategy providing the other bidders adopt ; and with n = 2 active bidders, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each bidder to adopt strategy ; and (iii) prior to the auction, a type-t bidder chooses to stay at price p 0 if and only if his expected payo¤ from the subsequent auction game is no less than u(0; t):
Our next theorem establishes that b is indeed an EPA equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Suppose A1-A6 hold. Then the strategy b constitutes an EPA equilibrium.
Proof. The proof that given n 3 active bidders, ( ; b) is an EPA equilibrium follows similar (lengthy) arguments as in Hu, O¤erman and Zou (2011, Theorem 1);
hence is omitted. Because the e¤ect of a binding reserve price has not been considered previously, to complete the proof we consider the pre-auction stage here assuming that active bidders will follow strategy in the …rst stage of the EPA.
First, suppose a potential bidder has type t < t 0 so that (t) < p 0 : Prior to the auction, he is unsure about the number n of bidders who will choose to participate at p 0 : We show that it is optimal for the bidder to abstain from bidding. If he stays at p 0 ; he faces three possible scenarios. (i) No other bidder stays at p 0 : In this case n = 1 and by (5) the bidder purchases the object at a loss.
(ii) Only one other bidder stays at p 0 . In this case n = 2 and the EA policy implies that the bidder will have no expected pro…t to be made. He has to quit immediately or else face a potential loss should he become the winner. (iii) There are n 3 bidders staying at p 0 (including this one with type t < t 0 ). Then, given that the other bidders will adopt strategy in the …rst stage, and given that these bidders have followed the pre-auction strategy so that their types are no less than t 0 ; the bidder with t < t 0 will have no chance to become a …nalist unless he deviates from strategy : This is suboptimal, however, as it is optimal to follow strategy in the …rst-stage.
Consider next a bidder with type t t 0 : It is clear that in all the above possible scenarios (i)-(iii), he will have an expected payo¤ higher than (if t > t 0 ) or equal to (if t = t 0 ) his status-quo utility u(0; t): Therefore, it is optimal for the bidder to participate in the auction.
We conclude that b is an EPA equilibrium.
Intuitively, with n > 2 active bidders the premium induces all types to bid higher in the EPA than in the EA, i.e., (t) > (t) for all t t 0 . 21 By the pre-auction strategy b , this implies that observing n > 2 leads to a "jump" in bids at t 0 in the EPA, resulting in no bid in the price interval (p 0 ; (t 0 )): As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, this jump bidding is caused by the uncertainty at the pre-auction stage about the number n of active participants under reserve price p 0 .
22 21 This follows from (7) that for X = (t); b 1 (t; (t)) > 0 is equivalent to u (0; t) > w ( (t); t).
Comparing this with (5) gives (t) > (t) for all t 2 [t 0 ; H).
22 Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) derive a similar jump-bidding property in their second-price auction equilibrium with negative externalities. In their model with two bidders and a binding reserve price, a subset of types with private values lower than the reserve price face the uncertainly whether the opponent will bid higher or lower than the reserve price (similar to our n > 2 or n 2 scenarios). By deduction, under both scenarios these low-value types will not stand to gain and therefore will bid zero. As the reserve price does not a¤ect the equilibrium bids by other types, which are higher than their true values due to the externality, the jump bidding occurs at the level of the reserve price.
Milgrom and Weber (1982) also observe a similar "jump"property in their analysis of second-price
The key implication of the jump bidding in the EPA is that when the seller chooses the same reserve price p 0 as in the EA, it will induce the same screening level t 0 so that the subsets of active types who are willing to participate in the EA and the EPA are the same. This implication is essential for our main results in Section 4.
Main Results
We now turn to investigating the welfare implications of the premiums, from the seller's perspective …rst, and then from that of the bidders.
Seller' s perspective
Suppose the seller's utility function, V; is twice di¤erentiable and that the seller has a certainty equivalent value for the object equal to v 0 p 0 : 
where the …rst term in (12) comes from event t (1) t 0 , the second term from event t (2) t 0 < t (1) ; and the last term from event t 0 < t (2) :
Now let f N (2)(3) denote the joint density of the second-and the third-highest types.
equilibrium with interdependent values and a binding reserve price. For related analyses see also, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) and Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) . 23 In our setting, if the seller were able to choose the reserve price optimally for the EA, then p 0 > v 0 (e.g., Hu, Matthews and Zou, 2010) .
The seller's expected utility in the EPA is then given by
where the term in (13) comes from event t (3) < t 0 < t (2) , the term in (14) from event t 0 t (3) , and
is the seller's revenue conditional on t (2) = y and t (3) = z t 0 .
The next theorem provides a key result concerning the lower bound for the difference between the seller's expected payo¤s in the EPA and the EA. This bound is "tight"in that it is reached under condition (i) in the theorem.
Theorem 2 Assume A1-A6, and that V 00 0. Then for all 2 (0; 1=2];
The inequality in (16) is (i) an equality if Q 1 = 0 and either V 00 = 0 or = 0:5; and (ii) is a strict inequality if Q 1 < 0, or if V 00 < 0 and 2 (0; 1=2):
Proof. The di¤erence between the seller's expected payo¤s in the EPA and the EA is uniquely determined by their di¤erence in the event t 0 t (3) : Therefore
Integrating by parts, and noting that R(z; (z)) = (z); we obtain
The partial derivative
By Lemma 4, we have b 2 0. So,
Since
It follows that
where we used (7) to obtain the last equation. Substituting this inequality into (18), rearranging terms, and changing the notation of variable z to t, we obtain (16) If V 00 < 0 and 2 (0; 0:5); then V 0 (R(y; (z))) < V 0 ( (z)) by the fact that R(y; (z)) is an increasing function of y: So the inequality in (21) holds strictly. This is also true with Q 1 < 0, which implies, by Lemma 4(ii), b 2 < 0 and therefore both inequalities in (19)- (20) hold strictly. The subsequent deduction will then lead to a strict inequality in (16).
By inspecting (16), we …nd that the relative performance of the EPA from the seller's perspective depends only on the distribution of the second-highest type F N (2) ; where (u( ; t); w( ; t)) in (17) stands for the preference functions of the pivotal bidder in the EA (i.e., t = t (2) ): Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for the EPA to outperform the EA is that the function (t) in (17) It is instructive to use Case 1' (and thus Case 1) as an example and see how the sign of (t) can be determined. For Case 1', w(x; t) = u(v(t) + x; t): So by (5), w( (t); t) = u(0; t) implies (t) = v(t): Now assume that
Then, by Lemma 1
In particular, for x = (t) we have
; 8t > t 0 ; by A5 and Lemma 1 (23)
This shows (t) > 0 and therefore V N ( ; p 0 jEPA) > V N (p 0 jEA):
The condition (22) means that regardless of the respective income levels, the seller is more risk averse than the type-t 0 bidder. This condition removes the "wealth e¤ect"
that may cause ambiguity in comparing relative risk aversion between individuals at di¤erent wealth levels. Indeed, in general, the bidders' degrees of risk aversion as being modelled depend on how we "normalize"their status quo wealth. This has been assumed to be zero in our model by convention. Such a normalization is innocuous if the bidders exhibit CARA, but in the case of DARA it makes the bidders "appear"to be more risk averse than they actually are -given the supposition that each bidder has su¢ cient funds to purchase the object for sale. To avoid such ambiguities, we therefore invoke the assumption Q 1 = 0 for the following propositions. This assumption is akin to the CARA assumption used elsewhere in auction theory (e.g., Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Matthews, 1983) as well as other …elds of studies.
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Our …rst proposition generalizes the preceding observation for Case 1'to Cases 2'-4'.
Proposition 1 For Cases 1'-4' (and therefore Cases 1-4), assume A1-A5, Q 1 = 0, and (22). Then a risk averse seller with reserve price p 0 has a higher expected utility in the EPA, given any premium rule 2 (0; 1=2), than in the EA.
The next proposition highlights a "businessman's case"in which the seller's preference belongs to the same population of the bidders.
Proposition 2 Suppose A1-A5 hold and Q 1 = 0: Suppose the seller's preference is the same as a bidder with type t 0 2 [0; H), and he chooses reserve price p 0 according to u(p 0 ; t 0 ) = w(0; t 0 ) (the seller's status-quo utility if there is no sale). Suppose
24 We agree with Milgrom (2004, p. 93-94 ) that using CARA is an analytical technique, and it by no means prejudges the importance of wealth e¤ects. Of course, alternatively, the conclusions of these propositions can be arrived at by simply assuming that the bidders exhibit DARA and are su¢ ciently wealthier than the seller. For instance, assume u(x; t) = U (c(t) + x; t) with c 0 > 0 and c(t) >> 0: But such "manipulations" will not add any new insight.
Not con…ned to Cases 1'-4', this proposition illustrates why in some circumstances the expected sales above the reserve price logically imply that the seller is better o¤ by employing the EPA rather than the EA.
The next proposition concerns the e¤ect of the number of bidders N prior to the auction.
Proposition 3 Under the circumstances of either Proposition 1 or Proposition 2, except that the seller does not impose a reserve price (i.e., reserve price equal to zero).
Then, for all 2 (0; 1=2); there exists a number N > 2 such that
It is easily seen from the proof of this proposition that the result holds not just for a reserve price equal to zero. The same prediction holds for any arbitrary reserve price, with a higher reserve price likely to be associated with a lower threshold number N of the bidders.
An immediate corollary concerning the expected revenue of Propositions 1-3 is as follows.
Corollary 1 Suppose the bidder population includes a risk neutral type, say, t 0 2 [0; H): Then, under A1-A6, for arbitrary reserve price p, (i) p (t 0 ) implies that the expected revenue in the EPA is greater than that in the EA; and (ii) p < (t 0 ) implies that for all 2 (0; 1=2); there exists an N > 2 such that the expected revenue in the EPA is greater than that in the EA for all N > N :
Proof. Because the corollary concerns expected revenues, it is consistent with a risk neutral seller in our model. Assume that both the seller and the type-t 0 bidder are risk neutral. Then, applying the results of Propositions 1 or 2 for Part (i), and of Proposition 3 for Part (ii) lead to the conclusions.
We conclude this subsection with two more corollaries that are of interest on their own.
Corollary 2 Suppose the bidders are risk neutral. Then the EA revenue is a meanpreserving spread of that of the EPA for all 2 (0; 1=2):
Proof. By the revenue equivalence theorem, under bidder risk neutrality the expected revenue is the same in the EA and in the EPA. For risk neutral bidders A1-A5 and Q 1 = 0 hold trivially. Hence, by Theorem 2, the EPA revenue is preferred by all types of risk averse sellers. Hence the conclusion (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) .
This corollary signi…cantly generalizes a result of Goeree and O¤erman (2004) , who showed that for uniformly distributed types the EPA revenue has a lower variance than that of the EA.
All preceding results do not assume any knowledge of the seller (except knowledge of his own preference). Now, if we assume that the seller knows the utility functional forms of u and w; as well as the distribution function of the bidder types F; then we have the next corollary. 
Bidders'perspective
We now turn to bidders' preferences for the auction forms. Among n (> 2) active bidders in the EPA under the reserve price p 0 , the …rst n 2 bidders who drop out are the same in either the EA or the EPA. As these losing bidders end up with their status quo utility under either auction policy, it su¢ ces to focus on the second stage EPA with any bottom price X = (r) given. To ease notation, we …x r and denote
Hence, '(t) is the premium and h(t) is the e¤ective payment by the winner if the EPA concludes at price b(t; X):
In the EA, when only two bidders remain, the expected utility of a type-t bidder equals
The same bidder in the EPA has an expected utility equal to
Therefore, in order to compare the bidders'preferences over the two auction forms it su¢ ces to consider the sign of
and show that (t; t) > 0 for all t 2 (r; H]:
Homogeneous utility
We …rst show a clear-cut result for the homogeneous-utility model.
Theorem 3 For the homogeneous-utility model, assume A1-A4, w 2 > 0; and 25 w 12 (x; t) w 1 (x; t) (t); 8x 2 [ (t); 0)
Proof. For the homogeneous-utility model, u 2 (x; t) 0 so that by the envelope theorem,
By the assumption w 12 (x; t) = (t)w 1 (x; t); integrating over x gives w 2 (x; t)) w 2 (y; t) = (t) (w (x; t)) w(y; t)) ; 8x; y 2 [ (t); 0)
If (t; t) 0 for some t > r; then R t r (w ( h(y); t)) w( (y); t)) dF (y) < 0 as u('(t); t) > u(0; t): But then (27) implies 2 (t; t) > 0 for (t) > 0: We know (r; r) = 0: Thus (t) > 0 implies (t; t) > 0, or U (tjEPA) > U (tjEA); for all t 2 (r; H]:
Observe that, in the proof of this theorem, no assumption is made about risk aversion of the status quo utility u (apart from A4 that u is log-concave). The conclusion of the theorem depends only on risk aversion of bidders'utility w upon winning.
A straightforward implication of this theorem is that risk sharing in the EPA makes all risk averse bidders better o¤ -at least when income e¤ects are negligible.
We provide a numerical example below to visualize the premium e¤ects on the seller's, bidders', and total surplus of expected payo¤s.
Example
Consider Case 1. Suppose n = 3 and t is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]; and that the seller does not impose a reserve price. Suppose that bidders'utility U exhibits CARA:
In the EA, Case 1 implies the equilibrium condition w( (t); t) = U (t (t)) = 0 so that (t) = t. In the EPA, the di¤erential equation (7) with boundary condition (8) has an explicit solution
where the bid function b (t) is independent of the bottom price X: By (10), this implies (t) = b (t) so that all bidders will adopt the same strategy b in both the …rst and second stages. Now suppose the seller also has a CARA utility function
The density function f n (2)(3) (y; z) now equals 6(1 y), so the seller's expected utility equals 26 V ( ) = 6
From any bidder's viewpoint, the density of the highest and second highest types from among the other bidders is f n 1
(1)(2) (y; z) (= 2). Thus, given the bidder's type t; his expected utility equals
Ex ante, the expected utility of an active bidder equals Table 1 shows numerical results for the case with = 1 and = 2 under di¤erent premium rules of : The column with = 0 corresponds to the EA. As can be seen, the seller obtains maximum expected utility at about = 0:3; and bidders prefer = 0:5:
The total surplus is maximized at = 0:5: 
Heterogeneous utility
We now extend the result of Theorem 3 to the heterogeneous-utility model. For concreteness, we will interpret t as a parameter that is positively associated with a bidder's wealth. A natural implication of this interpretation is that risk aversion is associated 26 Without ambiguity, we use the same notation V (and U ) to denote expected utility at each stage.
Figure 1: There is a threshold point at which the EA bid function (t) crosses the EPA e¤ective payment function h(t) from below.
with the property that u 12 0; with u 12 = 0 being a special case for homogeneous or risk neutral bidders.
For generality, we allow u and w to exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion.
As implied by the boundary condition (8) and (9), the e¤ective payment function h(t) satis…es h(r) > (r) and h(H) < (H). Consequently, there is a crossing point at which (t) h(t) switches the sign from negative to positive. To simplify the analysis, in what follows we assume that (t) h(t) has a single crossing property that for any t 2 [r; H); (t) h(t) implies (t) h(t) for allt 2 (t; H] (see Figure 1 ).
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27 The crossing point can be more generally de…ned by = infft 2 [r; H) : (t) h(t)g. Su¢ cient conditions for such a single crossing property to hold can be identi…ed for speci…c cases, which we do not pursue here given the space limit.
To ease exposition, let x e and x p denote respectively the e¤ective income of a …nalist in the EA and EPA, such that E t U (x e ; t) = U (tjEA) and E t U (x p ; t) = U (tjEPA)
as de…ned in (24) and (25). 28 In general, the e¤ective income is a random variable that depends on a bidder's type t; the opponent's type y and possibly the ensuing risk. Because U 1 (x; t) > 0; the e¤ective income can be always well de…ned given any speci…cation of w(x; t): For example, for Cases 1'and 2', we de…ne for any function such that 0 > 0 (with 0 1 for Case 1'),
The following lemma shows that when bidders are risk averse, the premium increases the expected e¤ective income for any type of a …nalist under various circumstances. The lemma generalizes our previous work (Hu, O¤erman and Zou, 2011) in that bidders now exhibit heterogeneous risk preferences, and that the auctioned object may carry ensuing risks.
Lemma 5 For Cases 1'-3' suppose A1-A3, A5-A6 hold, and U 11 ( ; t) < 0 for all t 2 [0; H]. Suppose further for Case 3'that Q 1 = 0. Then the expected e¤ective income by any type of the bidders is higher in the EPA than in the EA.
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The analysis of the risk sharing e¤ects on bidders'expected utilities is complicated by the fact that, although in the EA no bidder expects to end up with a loss, in the 28 The expectation operator E t ( ) indicates that the expectation may be taken conditional on t; such as in Case 3 and Case 3'. 29 The marginal utility in Case 4'exhibits a jump upon winning and consequently U 11 (x; t) < 0 does not imply risk aversion "in the large."In the homogeneous-utility model of Maskin and Riley (1984) , the absolute risk aversion in Case 4 is required to be greater than 2. In the more general Case 4', it can be shown that the result of this lemma holds if U is "su¢ ciently" risk averse. We drop this case for clarity of the conclusions.
Figure 2: In situation t < the type-t …nalist has the potential risk of losing money.
This will happen when the opponent has a type y < t that is su¢ ciently close to t: In situation t > the type-t …nalist is ensured to earn a positive surplus.
EPA this can happen to a subset of low-type bidders when t < (see Figure 2 ). As it turns out, the case with t < requires some mild additional assumptions for an unambiguous determination of the premium e¤ect. The situation with t > does not require these additional assumptions, and has a stronger implication thatx p dominates x e by second-order stochastic dominance.
Our last theorem concerns the general result that risk averse bidders prefer the EPA to the EA under various circumstances.
Theorem 4 For the heterogeneous-utility model, suppose A1-A6 hold and u 11 , w 11 < 0. Then U (tjEPA) > U (tjEA) w 12 (x; t) w 1 (x; t) < u 12 (y; t) u 1 (y; t) 0; 8x; y : (t) x < 0 y:
(ii) for all t 2 ( ; H] if (t) h(t) has the single crossing property on [r; H] and
Proof. (i) It can be readily veri…ed that condition (29) is equivalent to @ @x
and by Lemma 1, (29) implies @ @t w(x; t) w(y; t) w 1 (x; t) 0; 8x; y 2 [ (t); 0)
Consequently, for all x; y 2 [ (t); 0); w 2 (y; t)) w 2 (x; t) (w (y; t)) w(x; t)) w 12 (x; t) w 1 (x; t)
Consider now (s; t) given in (26). We have
Substituting (y) for x and h(y) for y in (32), we deduce
The condition in (29) says that the absolute risk aversion of w(x; t) is nonincreasing in t. Condition (30) could be interpreted as requiring that the rate of change in the marginal utility of w is relatively lower than that of u as t increases. For the homogeneous-utility model, this is a natural consequence of risk aversion as w 12 < 0 u 12 : For the heterogeneous-utility model, (30) holds for Cases 1'-3' as long as u 11 < 0 and u 11 =u 1 does not decrease "too fast" as income increases over the relevant domain. This nests CARA as a special case. For Case 4', the condition requires u to be "su¢ ciently" risk averse.
Because w ( h(y); t)) w( (y); t), by the (…rst) mean value theorem in integral calculus, Z s r (w ( h(y); t)) w( (y); t)) w 12 ( (y); t) w 1 ( (y); t) dF (y) = w 12 ( ( ); t) w 1 ( ( ); t)
On the other hand, we have for s > r;
where the last equation derives from the generalized mean value theorem.
Because R s r (w ( h(y); t)) w( (y); t)) dF (y) < 0, we have by (30), (33), and
Because u 12 0, it follows by the envelope theorem that (t; t) 0 implies
We have (r; r) = 0. Thus (t; t) > 0 or U (tjEPA) > U (tjEA) for all t 2 (r; ].
(ii) We prove this part of the theorem by a simpler graphical argument. De…ne the induced cumulative probability distributions ofx e andx p by
It can be readily veri…ed by inspecting Figure 2 that the relations between G e (xjt) and G p (xjt) can be depicted as in Figure 3 . By assumption, we have
and for t > , G p crosses G e from below exactly once. We therefore conclude that (e.g., Jewitt, 1987 , Theorem 1)x p dominatesx e in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, 31 which implies U (tjEPA) > U (tjEA) for all t 2 ( ; H]:
Summarizing, this section has demonstrated a variety of circumstances in which the EPA Pareto dominates the EA at the interim, and therefore also at the ex ante stage of the auction game with incomplete information.
Summary and Conclusion
We have presented an analysis of risk sharing e¤ects in English premium auctions (EPA) with risk averse seller and bidders. 32 Our study reveals that when both the seller and bidders are risk averse, the English auction is in general ine¢ cient at the interim stage. By simple modi…cations of the payment rule of the English auction, the auction designer can often make the auction more attractive to both the sellers and buyers when they are risk averse. This …nding has signi…cant normative and positive implications. Because of the overwhelming evidence that the majority of individuals are risk averse and that people di¤er in their risk attitudes, the EPA format presented in this paper could be of interest to designers of auctions in practice. On the positive side, the result of our study provides a plausible risk-sharing motive that helps explain why premium auctions have stood the test of time and remain a class of regularly adopted auctions in Europe. 31 Obviously, the same conclusion does not hold for t < as the left end of the support of G p is lower than that of G e :
32 Hu, Matthews and Zou (2013) study a similar English auction model with ensuing risk and heterogeneous bidders, allowing for a more general setting. Their focus is on the existence of ex post e¢ cient equilibria and the e¤ects of ensuing risks. Figure 3 : G e (xjt) and G p (xjt) are the induced cumulative distributions of a …nalist's e¤ective income under the EA and the EPA, respectively. When t > ; G p crosses G e only once from below and therefore dominates G e in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance given that the expected e¤ective income is higher under G p rather than G e :
An important related issue not considered in this paper is how rewarding premiums would a¤ect the potential bidders'entry decisions (e.g., Levin and Smith, 1994; Smith and Levin, 1996; Klemperer, 1996, 2009) . We have assumed a …xed number of potential bidders and showed that risk averse bidders will unanimously prefer the EPA to the EA irrespective of the seller risk preference. Therefore, it is conceivable that when potential bidders make entry decisions based on their expected payo¤s, and acquire information at some costs after entry, the EPA will be more conducive to entry than the English auction. From the seller's viewpoint, this could increase revenue by more than an optimally structured auction does with fewer bidders (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) . So, even if the seller is risk neutral, the use of EPA could make sense for attracting more bidders. With endogenous entry, risk sharing between the seller and bidders in an EPA could improve ex post allocation e¢ ciency when more bidders are attracted to the trade, while an auction format that is more attractive for sellers could also encourage its actual usage. 34 For example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) , Ausubel (2004) , and Reny (2002, 2005) . Along the lines of the VCG mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961; Clark, 1971; Groves, 1973) , all these auction procedures were designed under the assumption that the players are risk neutral or have quasilinear utility functions.
sides of the above inequality increase in v; taking expectations maintains the inequality: R U (x (y v) ;t)dK(vjt) U (x;t) U 1 (x;t) > R U (x (y v) ; t)dK(vjt) U (x; t) U 1 (x; t)
This shows Q(x; y; t) > Q(x; y;t); verifying A5.
Proof of Lemma 4. The di¤erential equation in (7) can be more succinctly written as b 1 (t; X) = 1 Q( (b(t; X) X); b(t; X); t) f (t) 1 F (t)
where Q is de…ned in (2). Because the right-hand side of (7) is continuously di¤eren-tiable in b; t; and X, the solution b(t; X) is continuously di¤erentiable in t and X on its e¤ective domain (e.g., Hale, 2009 , Chapter 1, Theorem 3.3). Di¤erentiating w.r.t. 
where Q 1 = 1 w 1 u 1 Q u 11 u 1 and Q 2 = w 1 u 1
By ( Therefore, we must have b 2 (t; X) 0 on the e¤ective domain of b:
Part (ii). Assume Q 1 < 0: Then by (40), Q = 0 implies w 1 > u 1 : Equation (41) now implies w 1 b 2 = (w 1 u 1 ) (b 2 1) < (w 1 u 1 ) b 2 and therefore b 2 (H; X) < 0:
We …rst show that b 2 (t; X) < 1 for all t 2 [r; H]: This follows because by (39), b 2 (t; X) = 1 implies b 12 (t; X) > 0; which is impossible given b 2 (H; X) < 0:
Now by (39), b 2 = 0 implies b 12 (t; X) > 0: This implies that b 2 (t; X) < 0 for all t H such that b(t; X) X (see, e.g., , Lemma 1).
Proof of Lemma 5. For Cases 1'and 2', it su¢ ces to show that
A(t)
Z t r ( ( h(y)) ( (y))) dF (y) + (1 F (t)) ('(t)) > 0
Di¤erentiating yields A 0 (t) = ( ( h(t)) ( (t)) ('(t))) f (t)+(1 F (t)) b 1 (t; X).
Substituting (7), and noting that v(t) + ( (t)) = 0; we have A 0 (t) = v(t) + ( h(t)) ('(t)) + 0 ('(t)) u ('(t); t) w ( h(t); t) u 1 ('(t); t) f (t) = U ( ('(t)); t) U (v(t) + ( h(t)); t) U 1 ( ('(t)); t) ('(t)) (v(t) + ( h(t))) 1
where the inequality holds because of U 11 < 0 by Lemma 1.
For Case 3', the e¤ective income also depends on the realization of the value of Proofs of the propositions Proof of Proposition 1. By Theorem 2, it su¢ ces to show that for all the cases considered, the function (t) de…ned in (17) is positive. The conclusion has been established for Cases 1 and 1'in (23). For Cases 2'-4'; Q 1 = 0 and w( (t); t) = u(0; t)
imply w( (t); t) = u( (t) (t); t). So by (23) (t) > 0 for all t > t 0 under (22).
Proof of Proposition 2. By Q 1 = 0; the seller's break even condition u(p 0 ; t 0 ) = w(0; t 0 ) holds i¤ u(0; t 0 ) = w( p 0 ; t 0 ): This implies that, in equilibrium, a sale occurs at a price greater than p 0 i¤ the pivotal bidder has a type t > t 0 . By the EA equilibrium u (0; t) = w( (t); t); the assumption Q 1 = 0 also implies u ( (t) (t); t) = w( (t); t): Hence, V ( (t)) V ( (t)) V 0 ( (t)) = u ( (t); t 0 ) u ( (t); t 0 ) u 1 ( (t); t 0 ) by assumption = u (0; t 0 ) u ( (t) (t); t 0 ) u 1 (0; t 0 ) by Q 1 = 0 > u (0; t) u ( (t) (t); t) u 1 (0; t) for all t > t 0 ; by A5 = u (0; t) w ( (t); t) u 1 (0; t)
This shows that (t) > 0 so that by Theorem 2, V N ( ; p 0 jEPA) > V N (p 0 jEA):
Proof of Proposition 3. When the reserve price is zero, by A2 all bidders participate in the EA and hence in the EPA (Theorem 1). The inequality in (16) reduces to
as can be seen by replacing 0 for t 0 in (16). We have where the last term is positive because (t) > 0 (by assumption that the seller is more risk averse than all types t > t 0 ). This term comes from event t (2) t 0 , and the probability of this event tends to 1 as N tends to in…nity. Hence, because the term (t)V 0 ( (t)) is independent of N; for all 2 (0; 1=2) there exists an N > 2 such that R H 0 (t)V 0 ( (t)) dF is a positive and increasing function of t: Thus (e.g., by Persico, 2000, Lemma 1)
(2) (t) =
The conclusion of the proposition thus holds true.
